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The Modigliani-Miller Theorem at 60:
The Long-Overlooked Legal Applications of
Finance’s Foundational Theorem
Michael S. Knoll†
2018 marks the sixtieth anniversary of the publication of Franco
Modigliani and Merton Miller’s The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and
the Theory of Investment, which purports to demonstrate that a firm’s value is
independent of its capital structure. Widely hailed as the foundation of modern
finance, their article is little known by lawyers and legal academics even though
it led to many major economic advances, such as agency costs and asymmetric
information, recognized and used throughout the law today. The legal
profession’s lack of familiarity with these Nobel Prize-winning authors and their
work is not merely an oversight; it is a missed opportunity. When inverted, the
Modigliani-Miller theorem describes the mechanisms through which capital
structure can affect value. This “reverse” Modigliani-Miller theorem provides a
powerful framework that can be extremely useful to legal academics, practicing
attorneys, and judges.
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Introduction
In June 1958, two young economists, Franco Modigliani and Merton
Miller, published an article, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and The
Theory of Investment in the American Economic Review.1 That article, which
directly challenged then-conventional financial orthodoxy, is today widely
acknowledged as the foundation of the modern academic discipline of finance.2
Yet, the article, which is still read by nearly all economics and finance graduate
students, is little known among lawyers and legal academics, many of whom
have never heard of or have only a passing acquaintance with the authors’ names
and their work. Nonetheless, MM (as the pair of authors, their joint articles, and
the theorems they contain are all colloquially referred to by economists)3 has
long been implicitly used throughout the legal profession, although the debt has
only been occasionally acknowledged and their work is rarely directly and
knowingly applied by legal academics.4 That oversight is unfortunate because
the first MM theorem, when reversed, provides a powerful framework with broad
applications throughout the law. As the sixtieth anniversary of the publication of
MM’s first article approaches, it is time for the legal profession to add the reverse

1.
Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and
the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958) [hereinafter Modigliani & Miller, Capital].
2.
Schools Brief: Unlocking Corporate Finance, ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 1990, at 81
[hereinafter Schools Brief]; J. Fred Weston, What MM Have Wrought, 18 FIN. MGMT. 29, 29 (1989)
[hereinafter Weston, Wrought].
3.
PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN
WALL STREET 174 (1992) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS]. Modigliani and Miller jointly
authored two more classic articles on the irrelevancy of capital structure. Franco Modigliani & Merton H.
Miller, Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUSINESS 411 (1961) [hereinafter
Modigliani & Miller, Dividends] (arguing under certain idealized conditions that dividend policy had no
impact on firm value); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of
Capital: A Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1963) [hereinafter Modigliani & Miller, Correction]
(correcting calculations of value of tax shield provided by corporate debt when there is a corporate income
tax).
4.
The few explicit references in the legal literature that I am aware of are William W.
Bratton & Simone M. Sepe, Shareholder Power in Incomplete Markets 15-17 (Inst. Adv. Studies in
Toulouse,
Working
Paper,
Nov.
1,
2017),
https://www.iast.fr/sites/default/files/IAST/conf/law/bratton.pdf; Claire Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost
Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1084-1106 (1996); Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll,
Corporate Finance, Corporate Law, and Finance Theory, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 175 (2000); Michael Knoll,
Taxing Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduction Discourages Innovation and Risk Taking, 38
VILL. L. REV. 1461, 1467 n.24 (1993); Michael S. Knoll & Daniel M.G. Raff, A Comprehensive Theory
of Deal Structure: Understanding How Transactional Structure Creates Value, 69 TEX. L. REV. 35 (2010)
[hereinafter Knoll & Raff, Comprehensive]; Kimberly D. Krawiec, Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and
Shareholder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1039, 1058-78 (1998).
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MM theorem to the lawyer’s toolkit,5 alongside other well-known economic
ideas, such as the Coase theorem.6
The rest of this Essay is organized as follows. After describing MM and its
development, I introduce the reverse MM theorem—the idea that if capital
structure matters it must work through one of the original MM theorem’s
assumptions. The three following sections then describe how the reverse MM
theorem can be used by legal academics, practicing lawyers, and judges in their
work. In each section, I provide one or more examples to illustrate how the
reverse MM theorem can serve as a framework to address a broad range of
recurring, but challenging legal issues. I then speculate as to why the reverse
MM theorem is not already widely known and used by lawyers before offering
a conclusion.
I. History
Modern business school finance departments are stocked with Ph.D.s
whose scholarship tends to focus on abstract questions with real-world
applications. Sixty years ago, the situation was different.7 Finance departments
were much smaller and something of a backwater. The field lacked mathematical
precision and conceptual rigor, relying heavily on accounting conventions, rules
of thumb, and anecdotes.8 The prevailing view at the time was that the impact of
leverage on the value of a firm was “complex and convoluted.”9 Debt was
generally considered preferable to equity because it was cheaper (the stated
return on debt was less than the implied return on equity10) and because interest
could be deducted, whereas dividends could not; however, there was thought to
be some unspecified upper limit on value-increasing debt because the risk of
corporate bankruptcy and the interest rate increased with leverage. However,
none of these intuitions had been formalized.11
With their 1958 article, MM directly challenged the prevailing thinking that
debt was cheaper than equity and that each firm had an optimal capital structure.
They argued that under certain idealized assumptions the amount of debt had no

5.

See, e.g., WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING
(2007) (listing and explaining more than thirty standard legal moves across economics,
philosophy, psychology and other fields, but not including MM).
6.
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
7.
The development of the MM theorems in the context of contemporary practice and
academic understanding is colorfully described by BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS, supra note 3, at 163-80.
8.
Schools Brief, supra note 2, at 82.
9.
STEPHEN ROSS, RANDOLPH WESTERFIELD, JEFFREY JAFFE & BRADFORD JORDAN,
CORPORATE FINANCE 497 (11th ed. 2016) [hereinafter ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE].
10.
The implied return on equity is the inverse of the price-earnings ratio or the
earnings-price ratio. According to Miller, at the time they were working on their first article, interest rates
on corporate debt were around three to five percent, whereas the cost of equity capital ran from fifteen to
twenty percent. Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years, 2 J. ECON.
PERSP. 99, 100 (1988) [hereinafter Miller, Thirty].
11.
BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS, supra note 3, at 167.
ABOUT THE LAW

3

Yale Journal on Regulation Bulletin

Vol. 36, 2018

impact on firm value.12 Expressed more confrontationally, MM averred that their
finance colleagues were wasting their time and their clients’ money trying to
ascertain what a firm’s optimal capital structure was because one capital
structure was as good as any other.13 That idea, which is also MM’s principal
substantive result and is today known as the capital structure irrelevancy
proposition, or more succinctly, as MMI,14 has been called “the bombshell
assertion.”15 As with many bold ideas, the underlying intuition is extremely
simple. In an interview after Modigliani won the Nobel Prize in Economics,
Miller (who subsequently won the prize, too) analogized their irrelevancy
proposition to slicing a pizza. A pizza can be cut into as many slices as desired
but doing so does not change the pizza’s size.16 Similarly, MM argued that the
firm’s capital structure divides the firm’s cash flows, but because it does not
change those cash flows, it does not affect the overall value of the firm, which is
just the present value of all of the firm’s cash flows.
Although MM’s main result is most intuitively expressed by analogy, they
presented their argument formally. MM began their formal argument with a
series of idealized assumptions. Although there are different ways to state the
MM assumptions, from a lawyer’s perspective, the most intuitive and helpful
listing of the MM assumptions is probably as follows:
Efficient capital markets – All investors have access to the same
information, which they process in the same way. As a result, all investors agree
on the market value of all cash flow streams.
Frictionless markets – There are no transaction costs. Contracts can be
costlessly written to cover all contingencies and can be costlessly enforced.
No taxes (or other regulations) – There are no taxes at the firm or the
individual investor level. There are also no government regulations, or at least
no regulations that relate to or are affected by capital structure.
Only cash flows matter – Investors care only about the cash flow generated
by an investment. Alternatively, no investments generate nonpecuniary benefits,
such as shelter (owner-occupied housing) or aesthetic appreciation (art).
Using only the above four assumptions, MM showed that a firm could not
change its value by adjusting its leverage. MM proved their central claim by
assuming the contrary result (that the firm could change its value by adjusting its
12.
Modigliani & Miller, Capital, supra note 1.
13.
Five years later, MM made a similar claim about dividend policy. Modigliani &
Miller, Dividends, supra note 3.
14.
MM derived two more theorems from MMI. MMII describes the relationship
between leverage and the required return on equity. MMIII holds that the weighted average cost of capital
to the firm is independent of capital structure.
15.
James R. Vertin, Editorial Board Commentary, 20 CFA DIG. 56, 57 (1990)
(appended to abstract of Weston, Wrought and recommending that article to subscribers because of
Weston’s “comprehensive review of the research that flowed from [MM’s] bombshell assertions”).
16.
ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 9, at 505. In their original article,
MM drew an analogy to milk. Although cream sells for more than whole milk, which in turn sells for
more than skim milk, a dairy farmer cannot increase the value of the milk by separating whole milk into
cream and skim milk. Modigliani & Miller, Capital, supra note 1, at 279-80.
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leverage) and then showing that the result could not persist in a market with
rational investors.
Because MM’s capital structure irrelevancy theorem was so out-of-step
with conventional thinking and practice, it was initially met with deep
skepticism.17 Many thought the theorem was simply wrong: that the conclusion
did not follow from the assumptions. However, after some back-and-forth and
various technical corrections, economists concluded that the argument was
correct as a matter of theoretical economics. Given the initial assumptions
(efficient and frictionless markets, no taxes, and only cash flows matter) the
result (a firm’s value was independent of its capital structure) held.18 Next,
skeptics questioned whether the assumptions were so inaccurate as to render the
theorem true as a matter of internal logic, but not very useful. Most practicing
finance professionals reached that conclusion and they largely ignored MM’s
work. Academic economists, however, took a different approach. For a time,
many accepted the theorem as fairly accurate and turned their attention to other
issues, but they did not ignore MM.19 Instead, they built modern finance upon
it.20
The economists, whether or not they accepted the MM capital structure
irrelevancy result, mined MM’s formal argument. By appealing directly to the
economic principle of one price—the notion that two perfect substitutes will sell
for the same price—the MM proof introduced the idea of arbitrage into financial
economics.21 Since its introduction by MM, financial economists have been
employing arbitrage arguments in order to develop new insights.22 Consider two
major examples from the 1960’s and 1970’s. The first example is the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM), which holds that investments are priced according to
their market risk (typically measured by beta – β), which cannot be diversified
away, not their unique risk, which can be eliminated through diversification.23
The second example is the Black-Scholes option pricing model, which
recognizes that a call option is equivalent to holding a share of the underlying

17.
The journal that published MM’s original article, the American Economic Review,
published five critiques and a brief sur-reply that Miller credited with publicizing MM’s methods and
results. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS, supra note 3, at 175.
18.
Id. at 174-77.
19.
See id. at 177-80.
20.
See id. at 181-269.
21.
Arbitrage is the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same asset (or cash flow
stream) in two different markets to take advantage of price differences. Profit-seeking arbitrageurs tend
to eliminate arbitrage opportunities forcing prices in separate markets to equalize. Economists use
arbitrage arguments to price an asset (the price of which is unknown) in terms of a second asset (the price
of which is known).
22.
E.g., Hal R. Varian, The Arbitrage Principle in Financial Economics, 1 J. ECON.
PERSP. 55 (1987).
23.
Much of that work was done by Jack L. Traynor, William F. Sharpe, John Lintner
and Jas Mossin.
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stock and borrowing against that share.24 Today, arbitrage is the cornerstone of
financial economics. Indeed, the MM proof has been called the “watershed
between old and new finance.”25
Economists, however, were not finished with capital structure. After a
roughly twenty-year hiatus, economists began to return to studying capital
structure.26 And when they did, they recognized that the MM capital structure
irrelevancy proposition provided the key to understanding capital structure.
By that time, financial economists had recognized that the MM irrelevancy
proposition had wide application. Given the original MM assumptions, it follows
that a broad array of corporate actions, not just leverage, have no impact on firm
value. Indeed, the MM assumptions imply that the value of a firm is determined
solely by the firm’s investments or assets (the left side of the balance sheet), not
how those investments are financed (the right side of the balance sheet). Thus,
for example, the MM assumptions also imply that hedging activities, leasing
versus owning, the form of legal organization, the compensation structure, the
state of incorporation and the legal rules that follow, and so much more have no
impact on firm value either. That suggests a tension, if not an outright conflict,
between the MM capital structure irrelevancy theorem and the goal of
understanding capital structure.
The key to reconciling this tension was to reverse or invert the MM
irrelevancy theorem. As Miller wrote in 1988, as part of a symposium on the
thirtieth anniversary of the publication of the first MM article, MM wrote their
original article in order to dispel much thinking about how capital structure can
affect firm value.27 However, by showing which aspects of capital structure do
not affect value, MM also showed how capital structure can affect value.28 Thus,
the power of MM is through the MM assumptions, which describe how capital
structure can impact firm value This idea is called the reverse MM theorem, and
it holds that capital structure can affect the overall value of the firm only by
releasing or withholding information, by decreasing or increasing transactions
costs, by decreasing or increasing taxes (or the costs of other regulations), or
through the allocation of assets with consumption elements. According to MM,
the above is an exhaustive list of how capital structure decisions can affect firm
value.
The reverse MM theorem, thus, takes the original MM theorem and turns it
on its head. It replaces the idea that under certain assumptions capital structure
24.
Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,
81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973).
25.
Schools Brief, supra note 2, at 82 (quoting Robert Merton).
26.
Miller, who continued to work on capital structure during the 1960’s and 1970’s,
was a notable exception to this trend. See, e.g., Merton H. Miller, The Corporate Income Tax and
Corporate Financial Policies, in STABILIZATION POLICIES 381 (1963).
27.
Miller, Thirty, supra note 10, at 100.
28.
Id.; see also BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS, supra note 3, at 176-80; Clifford W.
Smith, Jr., The Theory of Corporate Finance: A Historical Overview, in THE MODERN THEORY OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 3, 4 (Clifford W. Smith ed., 2d ed. 1990).
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does not affect the value of the firm with the idea that capital structure affects
firm value only to the extent that it operates through the MM assumptions.29
Starting in the 1970s, economists began to mine the MM assumptions for
insights into how capital structure affects the total value of the firm. Consider
the following two examples from that decade. Michael Jensen and William
Meckling argued that the conflicting interests of the managers and the owners of
a business generate agency costs, which the owners seek to reduce by monitoring
and writing contracts that bond their employees with contingent payments.30
Thus, Jensen and Meckling developed a theory of capital structure that exploits
the notion that the second MM assumption, frictionless markets, is false.
Around the same time, Stephen Ross recognized that managers are usually
better informed about a firm’s prospects than are its shareholders. Ross argued
that mangers could signal to shareholders that a firm’s prospects have improved
by raising the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio or declined by reducing that ratio. Ross
argued that investors can easily read these signals, which are credible because
they are costly for managers to send.31 Ross’s article, which was the first
application of signaling theory to finance, assumes that the first MM assumption,
informationally perfect markets, is wrong.
The above are only two examples—albeit two very important and highly
influential examples—of how capital structure can impact value. Over the last
forty years, economists have developed many ideas in addition to the two above
that illustrate how capital structure can affect value in situations where the
original MM assumptions do not hold (Miller himself developed many of the
ideas about taxes and value.32). And some of these ideas, including agency costs
and signaling, have made their way into the lawyer’s toolkit. However, the work
of MM, which gave birth to these ideas, and which in the form of the reverse
MM theorem serves as a framework that organizes these and many other ideas,
has not been incorporated. That is unfortunate because the reverse MM theorem
is a powerful analytical tool with a wide range of legal applications.

29.
The reverse MM theorem is the contrapositive of the MM theorem. The
contrapositive of a theorem “if A, then B,” is “if not B, then not A.” If a theorem is true, its contrapositive
must be true. The reverse MM theorem adds economic content because capital structure must affect value
through the MM assumptions (not merely because some assumptions do not hold).
30.
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) [hereinafter Jensen &
Meckling, Agency].
31.
Stephen Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signaling
Approach, 8 BELL J. ECON. 23 (1977).
32.
The most well-known of Miller’s solo work on taxation and capital structures is
Miller’s presidential address to the American Finance Association, which was published as Merton H.
Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261 (1977).
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II. Ivy Halls: Use by Legal Academics and Policy Makers
Scholars can use the reverse MM theorem for both positive and prescriptive
analyses. Positively, academics can use the theorem to understand why a
particular structure is used and how it has developed and changed over time.
Implicit in the exercise is the assumption that the observed structure is the
structure that maximizes value. The theorem is then being used to explain why
the observed practice is optimal. Scholars can also use the reverse MM theorem
prescriptively to criticize existing structures and to develop recommendations for
improved structures.
A. Positive Analysis
Use of the reverse MM theorem for positive analysis is sometimes explicit
in finance scholarship,33 but it is rarely explicit in legal scholarship.34
Nonetheless, sophisticated legal academics frequently make arguments in the
vein of the reverse MM theorem. Such arguments often take the form that some
capital structure is optimal because it solves a particular informational, incentive,
or tax problem, which is to say it solves a problem relating to a failure of one of
the MM assumptions. Contained within that argument is usually a nod to the
notion that the structure does not create or amplify other problems—that it does
not increase costs relating to a failure to meet the other assumptions.
The practice of aircraft leasing, for example, can be readily understood
through the reverse MM theorem. Airlines have three alternatives to fund new
aircraft: equity, debt, or capital (long-term) leases.35 Among the three
alternatives, airlines rarely purchase new aircraft by issuing equity or using
retained earnings. That is largely because equity financing is subject to two levels
of taxation—first at the corporate level and then at the investor level—whereas
borrowing and lease-financing incur only one level of taxation.36 Thus, airlines
rarely finance aircraft through equity because the tax cost, which relates to the
third MM assumption, is prohibitive.
If the airline were to borrow to purchase the aircraft, the airline could
depreciate the aircraft because the owner of tangible personal property is entitled

33.
E.g., Clifford Smith, Charles Smithson, & D. Sykes Wilford, Financial
Engineering: Why Hedge?, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 126 (Clifford Smith & Charles
Smithson eds., 1990).
34.
For examples in the legal literature where the reverse MM theorem is explicitly
drawn upon, see sources cited in supra note 4.
35.
The present value of the payments on a capital lease cover the cost of the equipment
less the equipment’s expected residual value plus the lessor’s return. A capital lease, which is a financing
technique, stands in contrast to a short-term or operating lease, such as renting a car while on vacation,
which is typically for convenience. Operating leases can be understood through the reverse MM theorem
as they avoid the transaction costs in buying and selling the leased item.
36.
The tax analysis below is for the tax law before it was amended by the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). Although some details, such as tax rates, change,
the preference for long-term leases remains.
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to the depreciation deductions on that property. Depreciation reduces income,
and thus provides the owner of the depreciable property with a tax benefit.
Moreover, aircraft are eligible for accelerated depreciation.37 These favorable
depreciation rules make commercial aircraft a tax-advantaged asset. Such assets
are worth most to high-bracket taxpayers confident that they will have the
income to take full advantage of the deductions.38 Airlines, however, are not such
taxpayers. The airline industry is capital-intensive (aircraft are expensive),
volatile, and low-profit. Accordingly, if the airlines took all of the depreciation
deductions from the aircraft they operated, they would frequently realize little or
no value from doing so. Thus, the aircraft lease and its close cousin, the leveraged
aircraft lease, were created in order to transfer the depreciation deductions from
the airlines to other taxpayers that value them more.
In an aircraft lease, a third party takes title and leases the aircraft to the
airline. The lessor as the aircraft’s owner uses the depreciation deductions to
offset other income. The airline benefits through a lower operating cost because
the lessor accepts a reduced lease rate. In effect, the airline transfers the
depreciation tax benefits to the lessor in exchange for a lower lease rate. In a
simple lease, the lessor would purchase the aircraft for cash, tying up capital.
Because it is the lessor’s tax attributes—and only those tax attributes—that make
it the preferred owner, most aircraft leases are leveraged leases. In a leveraged
lease, a lender provides most of the capital required to purchase the aircraft.
For a brief period during the early 1980’s, there was a practice called safe
harbor leasing under which any transaction called a lease would be respected as
such, even if it closely resembled a sale.39 In that environment, lessors would
transfer the full risk of ownership to lessees. Because lessors had no residual risk
from the aircraft (which was insured during the lease), they passed nearly all of
the tax benefits to lessees through lower lease rates. Later in the 1980’s, the safe
harbor leasing provisions were eliminated.40 The Internal Revenue Service
(Service) would then challenge parties’ characterization of transactions as leases
if the purported lessors had too little residual risk (under the tax law, ownership
is not determined by who holds title, but rather by who has the benefits and
burdens of ownership.). If the Service’s challenge succeeded, it would treat the
nominal lessee as owner (and hence the lessee, not the lessor, would be entitled
37.
The aircraft frame has an economically useful life of twelve years but is depreciated
over seven years using the declining balance method. See IRS, HOW TO DEPRECIATE PROPERTY (IRS
Publication 946), at 106 (2016).
38.
However, if an airline (or any U.S. taxpayer) has a net operating loss for the year,
the government does not typically provide a tax refund. Instead, the taxpayer receives a net operating loss
(NOL) carryforward. NOLs are not worth as much as current deductions because they can be used only if
the taxpayer has positive income. See I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A) (2012).
39.
The safe harbor was found in I.R.C. § 168(f)(8) and was enacted in title II, § 2(a) of
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 203. For a critical,
contemporary discussion of safe harbor leasing, see Alvin C. Warren & Alan J. Auerbach, Transferability
of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1752 (1982).
40.
Safe harbor leasing was repealed in 1982 as part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97–248, 96 Stat. 324.
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to the depreciation deductions). Accordingly, aircraft leasing changed. Leasing
remained, but lessors took on more residual risk, which created agency problems
because lessees controlled the aircraft during the lease. The lease documentation
became longer, and the parties and their lawyers carefully negotiated and
executed the leases so as to ensure that the lessors retained the requisite amount
of risk and that the resulting agency costs were controlled. Lease payments also
increased in order to compensate lessors for their increased risk and their
increased contracting and monitoring costs.41 Thus, the elimination of safe
harbor leasing led to changes in the optimal capital structure because it changed
the trade-offs across the four MM assumptions.
Although aircraft leasing can be understood without reference to the reverse
MM theorem, the theorem focuses on the relevant issues—taxes and
incentives—the optimal balance among which changed as the legal regime
changed. Used in this way, the reverse MM theorem operates as a template to
understand alternative transactional structures and their development over time.
B. Prescriptive Analysis
The reverse MM theorem can also be used to criticize inefficient capital
structures and to suggest how those structures might be improved. The reverse
MM theorem can be used prescriptively because it asks the right question from
an economic efficiency perspective—what structure maximizes the total value
of the firm—and provides a roadmap to answer that question. In corporate law,
the central issue of debate has long been the allocation of control rights among
corporate managers, directors, and shareholders. Because directors are typically
seen as passive, the corporate governance debate is usually binary: one side
argues that shareholders should have greater control rights and, concomitantly,
that managers should have less. The other side makes the opposite argument:
Managers should have greater control rights and shareholders should have less.
The arguments are often anecdotal, but they are increasingly econometric. These
competing views of the proper allocation of power between managers and
shareholders play out across such issues as staggered boards, waiting periods,
and takeover defenses.
The first view, the shareholder primacy position, is often described as the
agency model, and it emphasizes the agency costs from having managers make
decisions on behalf of shareholders. As such, the agency model is a
straightforward example of a violation of the second MM assumption of
frictionless markets. The latter view, the management primacy position, is
sometimes described as the commitment view. Under that view, activist
investors deter firms from making long-term, positive-net-present-value

41.
Accordingly, lease rates today also reflect airlines’ reputations for maintenance, and
the agreed upon use of the aircraft because how the aircraft is used—length of flight, altitude, etc.—
impacts the aircraft’s and its engines’ residual values.
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investments that cannot be valued by the market. Thus, the commitment view is
an example of a violation of the first MM assumption of informationally perfect
markets. The debate usually takes the form of which approach is better—
favoring managers or shareholders—which is to say whether the agency costs
from manager control are greater than the costs resulting from imperfect
information with shareholder control.
The reverse MM theorem suggests a different approach, one emphasizing
the need for a governance structure that maximizes the total value of the firm. A
third alternative that mediates between the above two polar positions is to
appoint stronger, more independent directors who can identify and value
investments that cannot be publicly disclosed (without losing value). Such
directors would allow the firm to capture the benefits from making long-term
investments not accurately valued by the market without the costs of managerial
entrenchment. Hiring and empowering such directors has the potential to
increase firm value above that from either polar position because it takes
seriously the concerns expressed by both sides and looks to alleviate each side’s
concerns without exacerbating the other side’s concerns. This suggestion, in
essence, is Ira Millstein’s proposal for activist directors who partner with
management, but who also take responsibility for the corporation’s strategy.42
As Millstein writes, he favors
a board-centric approach to corporate governance by placing more activist
directors in the boardroom – people who will ask the tough questions, challenge
management practices, and resist those who put their own agendas ahead of those
of the corporation and investors like you. Choosing directors will require new
diligence and care.43

Millstein developed his proposal for more activist directors without appeal
to the reverse MM theorem, but by drawing upon his lengthy and highly
successful legal career. For those who lack the in-depth knowledge and
experience that comes from decades of working at the pinnacle of the legal
profession, the reverse MM theorem provides a framework that should make it
easier to develop and defend efficient new forms of corporate governance and
capital structure, because the theorem focuses inquiry on the relevant issues and
provides a lens through which those issues can be examined and weighed.
Moreover, the observation or recommendation that directors should have
more power is only the beginning of the analysis. A more thorough and detailed
response would describe the additional duties directors take on, the powers they
should have, and the limitations there should be on their powers. In addition, a
more thorough analysis would describe how directors should be compensated
and how much effort they should apply to each firm. Although I do not know the
42.

See IRA M. MILLSTEIN, THE ACTIVIST DIRECTOR (2017) [hereinafter MILLSTEIN,

43.

Id. at ix (italics in original).

DIRECTOR].

11

Yale Journal on Regulation Bulletin

Vol. 36, 2018

value-maximizing answers to those questions, the path to finding them runs
through the reverse MM theorem, because the theorem directs those using it to
look for the structure that strikes the value-maximizing balance across the MM
assumptions.
C. Summary
The reverse MM theorem categorizes and partitions the various ways that
capital structure, which includes governance, can affect the total value of the
firm. The reverse MM theorem takes a large collection of seemingly unrelated
concepts and organizes them into categories of closely-related ideas. Once so
organized, these concepts can be used and applied more easily and systematically
to understand and evaluate existing financial practices and in the search for
efficiency enhancing innovations. This organizational framework is of particular
use to scholars because it leads them to examine the structure that maximizes
value across the MM assumptions, which MM have shown is the valuemaximizing structure (because everything outside of its assumptions has no
effect on value). The reverse MM framework can be used both to understand
capital structures and how they change over time, as with aircraft leasing, and to
criticize current practice and develop new ideas, as with governance. The above
examples only scratch the surface where academics can use the reverse MM
theorem to understand capital structure.44
III. Wall Street: Use by Practitioners
Lawyers who have taken a class in corporate finance would have seen the
MM theorem, and if they remember it, they probably consider it irrelevant to
their work. That is unfortunate because in its reverse form, the theorem can be
very useful to transactional lawyers (as I show in this section) and litigators (as
I show in the next section).
A. Training Lawyers
For nearly a century, transactional lawyers have been trained through the
Cravath method, named for Paul Cravath, of the New York law firm Cravath,
Swaine and Moore. Under the Cravath method, a junior associate would start by
working on a small piece of a transaction under the supervision of a more senior
associate. As the lawyer gained experience, he (and more recently, she) would
move up the pyramid, taking responsibility for successively larger portions of
the transaction and seeing closely at each stage how a more senior lawyer
handled the next stage. The rationale for such a method of training was that good

44.
When a structure is adopted for non-efficiency reasons, the reverse MM theorem
can be used to estimate the efficiency cost of not choosing the most efficient solution.
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transactional lawyering was more art than science, that almost everything there
was to learn (beyond the directly applicable law) had to be learned through
experience, by working with other lawyers, and that this craft could not be taught
in the traditional fashion of most academic subjects.45
Slightly more than thirty years ago, Ronald Gilson suggested that important
aspects of the professional education of transactional lawyers did not have to be
learned through an apprenticeship, but instead could be taught in the classroom.46
Gilson asked the following questions: Why do smart, sophisticated business
people hire business lawyers, and what is it that business lawyers do that makes
them valuable to clients? Gilson described transactional lawyers as business or
transactional engineers.47 Moreover, those lawyers face the same types of
fundamentally economic problems–dealing with incentives and imperfect
information—over and over again. Although those problems arise in different
situations and present themselves in different forms, ultimately there are only a
small number of basic economic concepts that underlie the core work of
transactional lawyers. Gilson further believed that lawyers would benefit from
studying these basic economic concepts. In Gilson’s view, such an economically
trained lawyer would be better able to recognize one of these issues and would
have a deeper understanding. 48 Also, by identifying and understanding the issue,
such a lawyer could more quickly and easily draw upon prior transactions to find
an appropriate solution, modify that solution to fit the situation, and even develop
new solutions when the situation demands it. Gilson then put that thought into
practice by teaming with two Columbia colleagues, Victor Goldberg and Daniel
Raff, and offering the first Deals course at the Columbia law and business
schools.
Deals courses typically begin by introducing the students to the relevant
economic concepts through the use of highly stylized examples. The course then
progresses through increasingly less stylized case studies that illustrate how
these issues present themselves in different legal contexts as well as some
standard techniques that address those challenges. The course typically
concludes with presentations by professionals of actual transactions, which are
then analyzed by the students. The students’ task is to explain why the
transaction was structured as it was, using the concepts covered in class. The
professionals’ presentations (and the students’ analyses) are intended to
reinforce the theoretical concepts covered in class by challenging the students to
find and identify those issues in actual transactions, underscoring the importance

45.
For a description of the Cravath model and a discussion of its economic rationale,
see William D. Henderson, The “Cravath” System: Excerpts from the Legal Profession Blog, TEACHING
LEGAL ETHICS (2008), www.teachinglegalethics.org/sites/default/files/Henderson-CravathSystem.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3QZN-X3TQ].
46.
See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson, Value].
47.
Id. at 253-56.
48.
Id. at 303-06.
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and ubiquity of such issues in practice, and giving the students an opportunity to
see how those issues were addressed by professionals. The practitioners’
presentations, however, are less successful pedagogically when the structure is
driven by one or more concepts not specifically covered in class. In that case,
there is an uncomfortable disconnect between the classroom pedagogy and the
final presentations. Accordingly, Raff and I, after Raff left Columbia for Penn
and recruited me to teach Deals with him, began using the reverse MM theorem
to organize the ideas presented in the course. Because the MM assumptions span
the ways transactional structures affect the value of a firm (and partition those
ways into silos), the reverse MM theorem ensures that the full range of ways in
which structure can affect value are at least introduced (and covered at a high
level of generality) even though not all variations can be explored at length.
Thus, even if a structure is largely driven by a particular issue not explicitly
covered in class, the driver can be placed in one of the four MM silos and its
similarities to other ideas can be drawn upon to understand the issue and its
resolution.49
Raff and I have found that there are additional pedagogical advantages from
using the reverse MM theorem to organize a Deals course. Lawyers (and other
transaction professionals) structure and execute transactions. Each step of the
way there are choices to be made that involve trade-offs within and across the
MM assumptions. The reverse MM theorem makes those trade-offs explicit.
Because it provides a framework that organizes the full range of ways in which
structure can affect value, the reverse MM theorem lies at the heart of
transactional lawyering. A lawyer who knows the reverse MM theorem and is
familiar with the main ideas in each silo is better able to understand the issues
driving a transaction. In addition, the same lawyer can more quickly acquire
knowledge because she is building out a framework (using the reverse MM
theorem as a skeleton), and she is better able to retain knowledge because she
can store it systematically, not just as a series of one-off examples. Such a lawyer
can also more readily recall and employ her knowledge when a new situation
arises because once she has identified and categorized the problem she can focus
her search for a solution among solutions to structurally similar problems across
various practice areas, rather than gravitating towards what has been done before
in the same practice area.50
The teaching of the reverse MM theorem is, thus, an example of the kind
of reform for which the 2007 Carnegie Report on Legal Education called. The
Carnegie Report criticized law schools for relying too heavily on post-graduation
apprenticeships in order to train lawyers and recommended that law school
faculty seek to identify powerful analytical frameworks that lawyers can use to
49.
Knoll & Raff, Comprehensive, supra note 4.
50.
Id. at 48. Such a lawyer would also be less likely to fall into the trap of selecting a
solution that resolves a particular problem within one silo, but inadvertently causes a larger problem
within another silo. Because the reverse MM theorem explicitly invites tradeoffs across silos, practitioners
are encouraged to examine the impact of a structure across all four silos.
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accelerate their transition from law students to successful practitioners.51 The
reverse MM theorem is precisely such a framework because it captures much of
what transactional lawyers do in practice, albeit at a high level of generality.52
B. Practice
The applicability of the reverse MM theorem can be illustrated through
some common examples from mergers and acquisitions. There are what might
seem to be (especially to a new associate) a bewildering array of methods
whereby one corporation (Purchaser) can acquire another corporation (Target).
The basic possibilities include:53 Purchaser acquires Target’s assets; Purchaser
acquires Target’s stock; Target merges into Purchaser (forward direct merger);
Purchaser merges into Target (reverse direct merger); Target merges into
Purchaser’s subsidiary (forward triangular merger); or Purchaser’s subsidiary
merges into Target (reverse triangular merger). The main result of all of these
transactions is the same – Purchaser ends up owning Target’s assets – but there
can be very different legal and economic consequences depending upon the
method chosen. The reverse MM theorem can help attorneys (especially
beginning attorneys) by giving them a better and deeper understanding of the
issues that drive the choice of merger-and-acquisition structure, which come
down to the MM assumptions. By recognizing the trade-offs across incentives,
informational asymmetries and taxes that arise with the different structuring
choices, the reverse MM theorem can also help lawyers to choose an acquisition
method. Indeed, as one reads sophisticated treatments by practitioners of the
various options and their advantages and disadvantages, their reasons regularly
relate back to and can be catalogued under the MM assumptions.54 A young
lawyer who has internalized the reverse MM theorem should find it easier to
acquire, store, retrieve and apply the relevant skills and knowledge required to
progress.
As another example where the reverse MM theorem can be useful, consider
an example Gilson emphasized in his original article, the negotiation of
representations and warranties.55 Representations and warranties are statements
of fact to which a party to a contract is attesting. Many of Target’s typical
representations and warranties concern Target’s assets and liabilities. For
example, Target usually represents to Purchaser that Target owns or has the
rights to the assets that it uses in its business and shows on its financial

51.
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 126-61 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]
52.
Knoll & Raff, Comprehensive, supra note 4, at 48.
53.
There are more complex methods as well.
54.
See generally JAMES FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND
TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS (1975) [hereinafter FREUND, ANATOMY];
CHRISTOPHER S. HARRISON, MAKE THE DEAL: NEGOTIATING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (2016).
55.
Gilson, Value, supra note 46, at 267-94.
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statements. Also, Target commonly represents to Purchaser that Target does not
have liabilities beyond those it has disclosed. James Freund, a retired Skadden
Arps mergers and acquisition partner and the author of a classic book on mergers
and acquisitions, describes the process of negotiating representations and
warranties as competitive, with each attorney trying to capture more value for
her client.56 In contrast, Gilson describes the process as cooperative (or argues
that it should be cooperative) because the less well-informed party (typically,
Purchaser with the above representations and warranties) wants assurances that
it is receiving what it is paying for and sellers have the incentive to provide this
information in order to encourage buyers to pay more.57 Thus, Gilson’s view of
representations and warranties fits nicely within the reverse MM theorem
framework. The representations and warranties respond to a violation of the first
MM assumption, perfect information, by providing Purchaser with useful
information about Target and assurances as to the accuracy of that information.
What about Freund’s competitive view of negotiating representations and
warranties? Recall that the reverse MM theorem holds that capital structure can
affect the value of the firm only through the MM assumptions, and hence the
capital structure that maximizes the overall value of the firm minimizes the total
cost from falling short of the assumptions. However, the lawyers negotiating a
merger or acquisition (and their clients) are not only interested in maximizing
the value of the deal; each side also has an interest in receiving as much value as
it can. Familiarity with the reverse MM theorem can help to explain the
disagreement between Freund and Gilson. The reverse MM theorem is a
statement about value creation, and the total value of a transaction can be
increased by providing information and assurance. The reverse MM theorem
says nothing about how that value is distributed. My conjecture is that among
experienced mergers and acquisitions lawyers, such as Freund, little time and
energy is spent negotiating the representations and warranties that cover what
the parties understand each needs. That, however, leaves more time and energy
to spend fighting over the division of (expected) surplus that characterizes the
rest of the negotiation.58 Thus, a scholar reading the final document could
conclude it is mostly cooperative, but the lawyer who negotiated it would say
more of the time was spent in competitive negotiations. For the new associate,
however, the challenge is often figuring out what is going on in the negotiations.
Understanding both the value creation and value distribution exercises taking
place and the role the reverse MM theorem plays with the former as well as the
conflict that often arises between value creation and value distribution can help
the young associate to become a more effective advocate and negotiator.
56.
FREUND, ANATOMY, supra note 54, at 229 (“I’m willing to bet my briefcase that
lawyers spend more time negotiating “Representations and Warranties of the Seller” than any other single
article in the typical acquisition agreement.”).
57.
Gilson, Value, supra note 46, at 271-73.
58.
The competitive aspect of negotiating representations and warranties is exacerbated
by the usual practice of negotiating only after the price and acquisition method are set.
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C. Summary
For most practicing transactional lawyers, the suggestion that much of their
work is an application of the reverse MM theorem is likely to be met with either
a shrug or resistance. Immersed in the details of a transaction while focused on
the competitive aspects of the negotiations, it is easy to lose sight of the big
picture and the scaffolding on which it stands. The reverse MM theorem is that
scaffolding, and the lawyer who has internalized that theorem has a powerful
framework that can be used to help to identify problems and tailor solutions for
her client even in complex and novel situations. Also, because of its breadth,
compactness and utility, the reverse MM theorem is a powerful pedagogical tool
that can accelerate young lawyers’ learning.
IV. The Court Room: Use by Judges and Litigants
Finally, one area where, to the best of my knowledge, the reverse MM
theorem has yet to be explicitly applied is in litigation. In this section, I describe
how the reverse MM theorem can assist judges in drafting common law rules
and litigators in seeking to persuade them.
Consider, for example, the calculation of prejudgment interest.
Prejudgment interest is interest that the defendant pays to the plaintiff on a
judgment. Prejudgment interest accrues from the date of injury until the date of
judgment.59 Federal law does not provide for a particular fixed or floating
prejudgment interest rate, nor does it explicitly call for a specific method of
calculation. Instead, the federal courts have sought to award prejudgment interest
at a rate that will compensate the successful plaintiff for delay. According to the
economics-based coerced loan theory, a successful plaintiff should receive
prejudgment interest at the defendant’s unsecured borrowing rate. The rationale
is that the defendant, through its wrongful action, has forced the plaintiff to make
a loan to the defendant, which debt would be treated as an unsecured debt in the
event of defendant’s bankruptcy. Accordingly, in order to compensate the
successful plaintiff for the risk of not being able to collect its judgment, the
defendant should pay the plaintiff interest at the defendant’s unsecured
borrowing rate taking the duration of the loan into account.60
59.
Interest that accrues from the date of judgment until payment is post-judgment
interest. Jurisdictions often have different rules for prejudgment and post-judgment interest and it is
common to have a fixed statutory rate or formula for post-judgment interest even if there is not a similar
rule for prejudgment interest.
60.
Gorenstein Enterprises v. Quality Care, 874 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1989) (awarding
prejudgment interest at defendant’s cost of unsecured borrowing); Jeffrey Colon & Michael S. Knoll,
Prejudgment Interest, in LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT 16.114 (Roman L. Weil, Daniel G. Lentz & Elizabeth A. Evans eds., 6th ed. 2017) [hereinafter Colon & Knoll,
Prejudgment]; Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest, 75 TEX. L. REV. 293 (1996)
[hereinafter Knoll, Primer]; James M. Patel, Roman L. Weil, & Mark A. Wolfson, Accumulating
Damages in Litigation: The Roles of Uncertainty and Interest Rates, 11 J. L. STUD. 341 (1982)
[hereinafter, Patel et al., Accumulating]. Proponents of the coerced loan theory recognize that defendant’s
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However, recognizing that the court should award the plaintiff prejudgment
interest at defendant’s cost of unsecured borrowing from the date of injury to the
date of judgment does not provide the court with all of the direction it needs to
determine a unique and unambiguous interest rate. In principle, the defendant
could have borrowed unsecured from plaintiff at a fixed interest rate or at an
array of floating interest rates. The coerced loan theory cannot resolve this matter
as there can be multiple market-based interest rates that can compensate the
plaintiff. In such circumstances, the reverse MM theorem suggests that the court
should adopt a rule that will minimize the combined cost to the parties from
failures of the MM assumptions. Litigants have some control over the pace of
litigation. Accordingly, because it is easier to delay litigation than to accelerate
it, and because a non-market interest rate gives one party an incentive to delay
(and the other to accelerate), a fixed rate obligation is likely to lead to delay
(which, in violation of the assumption of frictionless markets, is costly for the
parties and the court together). If interest rates have gone up (so the original fixed
interest rate is below market), the defendant will have incentive to delay;
alternatively, if interest rates have gone down (so the original rate is above
market), the plaintiff will have incentive to delay. In contrast, with a floating
market interest rate, because the plaintiff is not receiving an above-market
interest rate and the defendant is not paying a below-market rate neither party
has an incentive to delay.
More generally, there is a broad class of cases that involve choosing among
multiple remedies that could in principle compensate a successful plaintiff. Many
of these examples involve whether to make an ex-ante or an ex-post calculation
of damages.61 The choice of a fixed or floating prejudgment interest rate is such
an example as the fixed rate (the market interest rate at the date of injury) is an
ex-ante calculation whereas the floating rate (say, a series of yearly interest rates
from the date of injury to the date of the award) is an ex-post calculation. From
an expected value perspective, both ex-ante and ex-post calculations will
compensate the successful plaintiff. The reverse MM theorem provides a
framework for the court to use to allow it to resolve these issues efficiently

unsecured borrowing rate will not fully compensate plaintiff if plaintiff is an individual and the debt
constitutes a large portion of plaintiff’s wealth. If plaintiff cannot readily insure against or sell the claim,
then the risk of nonpayment will likely impact plaintiff’s consumption. In such cases, defendant’s
borrowing rate will not fully compensate plaintiff for having funds tied up with defendant. Conversely,
when plaintiff is a public corporation, or the claim is small relative to wealth, defendant’s unsecured
borrowing rate is sufficient to compensate the plaintiff. Colon & Knoll, Prejudgment, at 16-17; Knoll,
Primer, at 345-47; Patel et al., Accumulating, at 354-62. The above can be understood as applications of
the reverse MM theorem. When informationally imperfect markets and market frictions make it
impractical for plaintiff to sell a claim for its expected value, a plaintiff might require extra compensation
to compensate for delay.
61.
See generally Elizabeth A. Evans & Roman L. Weil, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Damages Calculations, in LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT 5.223 (Roman L. Weil, Daniel G. Lentz & Elizabeth A. Evans eds., 6th ed. 2017).
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because it will focus the court’s attention on the informational, incentive and tax
differences across the alternative rules and their impact on the parties.62
V. Why the Oversight?
The question, “if you’re so smart, why aren’t you rich?” has been a cliché
since at least the time of Aristotle.63 The variant here is if the reverse MM
theorem is such a useful framework for the law, why hasn’t it already been
adopted? One answer is that it has in that so many of the ideas economists have
developed using the reverse MM theorem, such as asymmetric information and
agency costs, have been incorporated into the law. However, the reverse MM
theorem itself has not been generally and widely adopted as an ordering
principle, which is its incremental value after six decades of scholars building
out its main insight. Of course, as an intellectual framework or ordering
principle, its exclusion does not withhold any specific idea or preclude any
specific analysis. What is lost is a more effective way of ordering and drawing
upon knowledge, which still leaves the question.
As for the failure of transactional lawyers to adopt the reverse MM theorem
a possible partial explanation is that the theorem would often apply in an
environment where both value creation and value distribution are taking place
simultaneously. As described above, mergers and acquisition negotiations,
including negotiations of representations and warranties and choosing a
particular acquisition or merger structure, are simultaneously both cooperative
and competitive.64 In such circumstances, the competitive aspects frequently
overshadow the cooperative aspects.65 The reverse MM theorem addresses only
the cooperative aspects, and so it does not address all aspects of the negotiations,
let alone the most confrontational, which could make it easy to overlook.
Nonetheless, as negotiation experts regularly emphasize, understanding the

62.
Of course, the reverse MM theorem is about economic value or efficiency; it says
nothing about non-economic values, such as distributional fairness. Accordingly, if an award is made not
to maximize efficiency, but with a nod towards other values, such as distributional fairness, the reverse
MM theorem provides a framework through which to examine the efficiency costs of pursuing other
values.
63.
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. I, ch. 11, reprinted in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 1990 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) (describing how the philosopher Thales, when reproached
for his poverty, used his knowledge of meteorology to predict a bumper olive crop; Thales then rented all
of the olive presses at a reduced rate months before the harvest; when the harvest came in as Thales
anticipated, Thales rented out those presses at a substantial profit).
64.
FREUND, ANATOMY, supra note 54, 229-84 (representations and warranties);
MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND BUYOUTS ¶104 (2001) (deal
structuring).
65.
See ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM L. URY, & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2011). Although some other authors view the GETTING
TO YES authors as having gone too far in the cooperative direction, the authors of GETTING TO YES were
early writers on negotiation to recognize the importance of the cooperative aspect.
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relevant issues and the potential value they have to all parties is a sure way to
make one a better negotiator.66
Another possible reason for the oversight is suggested by an important
recent working paper by Professors Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams,
entitled Inverted Theories.67 Fennell and McAdams argue that some of the most
well-known ideas in law, including the Coase theorem, the Tiebout hypothesis,
and Kaplow and Shavell’s theory of tax superiority, are commonly understood
in their original form, in which they yield negative or impossibility results.68
Fennell and McAdams further argue that the heavy emphasis on the original form
of the theorem and the near-total absence of its inverse or reverse form is a major
error that calls for correction.69 According to Fennell and McAdams, the above
theorems are better understood in their inverted form, which takes the focus off
of the negative or impossibility result and puts the focus on the assumptions.70
Moreover, Fennell and McAdams attribute the emphasis on the original form of
the theorem as connected with the conservative political valence of such negative
or impossibility result, as opposed to the inverse, which invites an inquiry into
situations where the theorem’s assumptions do not hold, which they argue is
more appealing to liberals.71
Thus, as applied to the reverse MM theorem, Fennell and McAdams’
analysis suggests several reasons why the reverse MM theorem might not have
caught on. First, that reverse theorems or inverted theorems are uncommon if not
completely unknown in the law. The reverse MM theorem is, of course, such an
inverted theorem. Moreover, the reverse MM theorem in its original forms says
little about law—or at least little that is likely to appeal to lawyers—since it
implies that transactional lawyers are wasting their time and their clients’ money.
If the MM theorem is accurate, then lawyers are just transaction costs and add
no value for their clients. That is not a theorem that lawyers (or legal academics)
are likely to embrace. Finally, the MM theorem (as well as the reverse MM
theorem) would seem to have little political valance, which would eliminate the
ideological motivations that Fennell and McAdams credit for raising the profiles
of their original, uninverted examples.

66.
E.g., JAMES C. FREUND, SMART NEGOTIATING: HOW TO MAKE GOOD DEALS IN THE
REAL WORLD (1992); G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE (2006).
67.
Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Inverted Theories (University of
Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 648, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3017437 [https://perma.cc/5CCX-2VDG]. If a theorem is of the form “if A, then
B,” the inverse of the theorem holds “if not A, then not B.” In contrast with the contrapositive, which is
true if the theorem is true, the inverse is not true simply because the original theorem is true.
68.
Id. at 4-5.
69.
Id. at 5-7.
70.
Id. at 1-2.
71.
Id. at 30.
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Conclusion
Sixty years ago, Professors Modigliani and Miller unveiled their capital
structure irrelevancy theorem and revolutionized financial economics with their
“bombshell assertion” that under certain idealized assumptions the total value of
a firm was independent of its capital structure. Although their theorem has made
little inroad into law, many ideas that have developed out of their fundamental
insight—that capital structure can affect firm value only through the original
MM theorem’s assumptions—are today part of the canon of foundational legal
ideas, such as informational asymmetries and agency costs. However, the failure
to recognize the many legal settings where the reverse MM theorem can be
applied and the numerous issues it can illuminate has deprived legions of lawyers
of a powerful analytical framework. Explicitly incorporating the reverse MM
theorem into legal analysis and giving it a prominent place in the legal canon
will help legal academics, practicing lawyers, and judges all perform their work
better. That is because much legal work involves designing and executing valueenhancing capital structures, and the reverse MM theorem provides a roadmap
for doing so.
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